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This paper analyses two challenges in the reform of urban transport pricing. The first 
challenge is the construction of an optimal package of urban transport pricing 
instruments assuming one benevolent government level that maximizes overall 
welfare. We examine the welfare gains from implementing in succession better 
parking prices, improved public transport prices and time varying tolling.  It is found 
that parking and tolling are the most important elements of the optimal package and 
that the alternative policy instruments are sub-additive in their benefits. The second 
problem studied is the use of these pricing instruments by different government 
levels. We examine a case where an urban government controls parking fees and the 
regional government controls the tolling. Although both government levels have 
different objective functions, we find that the overall efficiency losses in the Nash and 
Stackelberg equilibria are limited.  
 
JEL codes :  R48, H71, H21 
 
 
                                                 
1 The research summarised in this paper was carried out as part of the EU Fifth Framework research 
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acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the European Commission. The authors are indebted to Sara Ochelen for her help 
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Edward Calthrop for their help with the TRENEN model and to Bruno De Borger, André de Palma and 
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2 Stef Proost, CES-KULeuven and CORE, Ahksaha Sen, CES-KULeuven  1.Introduction  
 
There is a growing interest in the use of transport pricing and taxation to solve 
transport problems. Often a combination of pricing instruments is used, varying from 
gasoline taxes to tolls and parking charges. In many instances the authority over the 
different instruments is spread over different government levels. Gasoline taxes are 
usually determined at the federal level while parking fees are typically fixed at the 
urban levels. This leads us to the two topics we will study in this paper. The first is the 
construction of an optimal package of pricing instruments. We examine the role of 
parking fees, public transport pricing and time varying road tolling, what each 
instrument can achieve on its own and what is its value added if instruments are 
combined. This exercise conveys important information for an implementation plan of 
better urban transport pricing.  
 
The second topic we study are the possible efficiency losses when the different 
pricing instruments are controlled by different levels of governments. As the different 
government levels are elected by different sets of voters they will in general pursue 
different objectives. How important is this problem when there is no coordination 
between the different governments?   
 
As analytical results are difficult to derive we devote most of our attention to a 
modelling case study for the city of Brussels. With the model we first compare the 
performance of alternative sets of policy instruments when there is only one welfare 
maximizing government. Next we introduce two government levels: we let the city 
government choose the parking fees and the regional government choose the level of 
the cordon toll to enter the city. Comparison of the non-cooperative equilibrium 
where power is shared between two government levels and the equilibrium where 
there is only one government level allows us to estimate the potential efficiency 
losses.  
 
Section 2 presents briefly the transport model that will be used and the current 
transport pricing inefficiencies in Brussels. Section 3 examines the contribution of 
different types of pricing instruments to an optimal implementation plan. Section 4 is 
devoted to a detailed description of the policy setting and the differences in objectives 
of an urban and a regional government. In Section 5 we explore numerically the case 
where the urban government controls parking fees and where the regional government 
controls a cordon toll around the city. Section 6 concludes. 
 




The case study concerns the city of Brussels. It is the capital of Belgium and has 1 
million inhabitants. The presence of the federal government, of the offices of the 
European Community together with the service industry (banking, insurance etc.) 
entails a lot of commuting: some 0.6 million people commute daily into Brussels. The 
city has a fairly well developed public transit system with a metro system, busses and some regional trains. Public transport accounts for 28% of the urban passenger 
transport market.  There are no detailed plans yet for a cordon toll but this cordon 
could very well be placed outside the city borders near the ring. 
We will use the strategic model TRENEN-II URBAN
3. The strategic model simplifies 
the urban network to one link but has the advantage that it can look for optimal 
combinations of price and regulatory policies. Urban and regional government policy 
choices can then be simulated by optimising their objective functions.  
The TRENEN-II model structure is explained in more detail in the next subsection. In 
the final subsection we discuss the calibration and the properties of the reference 
equilibrium. 
The structure of the transport model 
 
The main idea of TRENEN-II URBAN is to model urban transport during a 
representative day as a one-link road network plus a one-link rail network with fixed 
capacity. Two periods of fixed length are distinguished: peak and off peak. 
In each period, the road link is used by different types of users: inhabitants and 
commuters, private cars and busses, cars paying for parking and cars having free 
parking, gasoline and diesel cars, small and large cars, solo drivers or car-poolers. The 
rail link represents metro and rail public transport that can be used in the peak and off 
peak.  
 
The generalised user cost of these different transport options is determined by the 
congestion level and the money price charged to the users. This money price contains 
all the resource costs and all charges paid, as well as the subsidies received. For given 
taxes, subsidies and regulations, travel time costs serve as the equilibrating 
mechanism to reach user equilibrium.  
 
Figure 1 shows the main components of TRENEN-II: a demand module, a supply 
module and an equilibrium price module in between. In addition there are two types 
of policy controls (shown as ellipses): transport taxes and technology regulation on 
vehicles. 
 
                                                 
3 There are several versions of the TRENEN model. The one used here is TRENEN II URBAN. The 
model description is based on Proost and Van Dender (2001). TRENEN –I  and II were acronyms for 
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Figure 1 Main components of the TRENEN-II model 
 
 
The demand part  
 
The model used in this case study only contains passenger transport
4. We model total 
transport demand via the behaviour of four representative individuals. There are two 
types of inhabitants; those who pay for parking and those who do not pay for parking. 
There are also two types of commuters; those who pay and those who do not pay for 
parking. Commuters will, compared to inhabitants, make longer trips to an urban 
destination (their urban trip is only part of the global trip) and will have to pay a 
cordon toll if there is one.  
 
The transport choices of a representative household are modelled via a nested CES 
utility function whose structure is given by Figure 2.  The choice possibilities are 
represented in detail for transport consumption, but not for other consumption; only 
the peak branch is shown in detail in Figure 2. In particular, a household can: 
•  Vary overall demand for transport, that is it can choose between transport and 
other goods; 
•  Choose the time of day for its travel (peak or off-peak);  
•  Choose between motorised and non motorised transport (that includes the small 
motorcycle as it is a good substitute for a bike)  
•  Choose between private and public transport modes;  
                                                 
4 One can easily add urban freight by using nested CES cost functions (see De Borger & Proost, 2001). •  For private transport there is a further choice between solo driving and shared 
driving (car pool), and for public transport there is a choice between metro or tram 
and bus; 
•  If the car mode is chosen, different sizes of vehicles are available; 
•  Finally there is a choice between diesel and petrol fuel. 
 
Car-pooling is considered as a separate mode. By doing so the overall occupancy rate 
for cars becomes endogenous. Non-motorised modes are aggregated into one mode 
because the case study focuses on congestion and air pollution problems, which 




Figure 2 Utility tree of a representative individual
6 
 
This leads to a total of 11 options in the peak (8 car options, 2 public transport options 
and 1 option to use slow mode), 11 options in the off peak and one non-transport 
option. Consumption of transport goods is measured in units of passenger kilometres 
for a specific type of vehicle in a given period. Demand functions depend on the 
generalised price of transport: the cost of transport consists of a money cost (the 
public transport fare or the expenditures for the use of a car) and a time cost (the time 
necessary for the trip multiplied by the value of time). The time requirement may 
depend on the mode of transport (car or public transport) and on the discomfort of the 
users (a minute lost when driving to work in the morning peak has a higher subjective 
value than a minute lost during a shopping trip in the afternoon). Trip distances are 
fixed by assuming fixed locations for all activities. The use of generalised prices is a 
shortcut for a more elaborate model with endogenous values of time. The shortcut is 
justified as long as values of time do not change between two equilibria. 
                                                 
5 Small motorcycles also contribute to noise and air pollution. 


















The supply part  
 
The supply part of the model (right hand side of Figure 1) represents the activities and 
choices made by the producers of cars and public transport. Assuming perfect 
competition among the suppliers of cars, supply will deliver at marginal resource 
costs plus producer taxes.  The producer can be forced by regulation to offer a 
particular emissions technology. 
 
Two types of modes are distinguished: public and private transport modes. Each is 
considered in turn. 
 
For the private passenger transport modes resource costs are taken as constant per 
vehicle kilometre
7. The costs of ownership and of car use are not explicitly 
distinguished. This is acceptable for a static implementation of a model that represents 
a long-run adjustment of the stock of cars. Six inputs are combined to produce a car 
km. There is no substitution possible between these inputs. To obtain one km in 
period X by individual of type Y with car type Z, a fixed amount of fuel and parking 
space and time is required. The other costs are vehicle depreciation costs, insurance 
costs, maintenance costs and (possibly) road toll costs. The relevant costs are the 
marginal resource costs per vehicle km. Money prices will then equal the sum of the 
marginal resource costs plus the sum of the taxes on each of the components. As 
regards vehicle costs, since fixed and variable cost components are not distinguished, 
the cost of the vehicle is expressed as a cost per vehicle km (assuming a certain 
amount of km driven during the lifetime of an average vehicle). A constant cost for 
each vehicle type (size and fuel type) is used. The parking cost consists of two 
components: the resource cost per hour of parking and the average parking time per 
trip. The cost of an hour of parking can differ according to time of day and vehicle 
size. Parking time may depend on time of day as well, and it can differ between 
residents and non-residents of the city. However, for the Brussels case study, parking 
costs are taken constant – on a per trip basis – over all these categories.  
 
It is assumed that public transport is completely controlled by the government. 
There are two types of public transport: busses and trams, and metro. Busses and 
trams are assumed to use the same road network, and both contribute to the overall 
road congestion while metro does not. 
 
All public transport modes are represented by a linear cost function that contains a 
fixed cost and a proportional variable cost that differs by period: capacity costs are 
fully allocated to the peak period as extra vehicles are only needed in this period. 
Walking times to the public transport stops and waiting times at stops are included in 
the generalised cost of public transport. Waiting times depend on public transport 
volumes according to the optimality rule for bus frequencies derived by Mohring 
(1972). It is assumed that frequency can be increased or decreased at constant 
marginal costs. Average bus occupancy rate is further assumed to be constant in each 
period. For Brussels it amounts to 40 persons/vehicle in the peak, and 9 
persons/vehicle in the off-peak. 
                                                 
7 We neglect differences in fuel consumption due to congestion.   
Equilibrium module 
 
For given values of the two sets of policy variables (taxes and technology 
regulations), the supply part (the right hand upper part of Figure 1) determines the 
generalised cost functions for each of the 22 transport options and for each of the 4 
representative households that are active on these markets. The generalised cost 
function is a function of the total car and bus kilometres on the urban link in that 
period. When the generalised cost functions are plugged into the 4 sets of 23 demand 




One can also select any objective function and any set of policy instruments and 
compute an optimum solution that is a users’ equilibrium. We use this feature to 
describe the transport policy choices of the two government levels.   
Calibration and Reference equilibrium   
 
The model is calibrated by using observed taxes and money prices, observed 
quantities, existing regulations, a speed flow function for the urban road link and 
assumptions on the cost of public transportation. This generates reference market 
equilibrium. Adding elasticities of substitution generates the demand functions and 
the utility functions for the 4 representative households. The elasticities of substitution 
are chosen such that the generated price elasticities conform to estimates that are 
available from the literature (see Proost and Van Dender, 2001).  Table 1 gives the 
price elasticities for the TRENEN model, averaged over all consumer groups and 
computed in the reference equilibrium.  
 
Table 1  Price elasticities in reference equilibrium (Brussels, 2005) 
 
  Car peak  Car off-peak  Public peak  Public off-peak 
Car peak  -0.36 0.025 0.12  0.0002 
Car off-peak  0.025 -0.54 0.001 0.65 
Public peak  0.025 0.0007  -0.19 0.0051 
Public off-peak  0.003 0.05  0.0054  -0.35 
 
Transport markets and traffic flows 
The geographical area for the case study is the zone within the outer ring road of 
Brussels. This area was chosen for two reasons: (a) an analysis of available data on 
transport flows shows that magnitude of flows and average speed clearly differs 
within and outside the ring; (b) the area within the ring is serviced by one urban 
public transport operator. The geographical scope also closely relates to the 
                                                 
8 Technically, the equilibrium is computed via maximisation of a welfare function with as constraints 
the demand equations and exogenous values of the policy parameters. The Nash and Stackelberg 
equilibria are computed by constructing many points on the reaction functions and looking for the 
intersection (Nash) or the highest utility for the leader on the reaction function of the follower.  administrative boundaries of the Brussels Capital Region. Data on traffic flows are 
derived from the projection for 2005, from IRIS (1993). This is the only detailed 
study available at present. The traffic flows are measured for a representative day. A 
day is the most relevant time scale for an analysis of urban transport problems. All 
prices, costs and taxes are for 2005, on the assumption that there is no change in 
policy with respect to 1995.  
 
We have four types of representative households; their number is given and is 
reported in Table 2. As can be seen there are more inhabitants than commuters and 
only a minority pays for parking. 
 
Table 2 Number of individuals of each type (Brussels, 2005) 
 
In 1000   Pay for parking  Don’t pay for parking 
Inhabitants   281 655 
Commuters  194 454 
 
Since a price difference exists between payers and non-payers, and price differences 
have an impact on demand, the impact of parking charges on the level and the modal 
split of transport demand by the 4 types of households is taken into account. 
Travellers who have to pay for parking consume less transport services, and the share 
of public transport in their total transport demand is higher than the share for those 
who do not pay for parking. It should be noted that parking demand at the trip origin, 
mostly residential on-street or off-street parking, is not included in the model. 
Reference Situation 2005 and initial pricing inefficiencies  
 
The upper part of Table 3 presents the cost structure for a number of transport markets 
in Brussels in 2005. Markets have been selected to reveal the most important pricing 
inefficiencies. The first row shows the price per passenger kilometre of a small petrol 
car driven alone, during peak hours, by an inhabitant who does not have to pay for 
parking at the trip destination. The time cost (€ 0.334 per vehicle kilometre) which is 
the difference, in the first line of Table 3, between generalised price (0.614) and 
money price(0.28), equals 54 per cent of the total trip cost. In the off-peak, for an 
otherwise identical trip, this share is only 35 per cent. Other price components differ 
between peak and off-peak only because of differences in speed that affect slightly 
fuel consumption. 
 
The money price in row 1 is lower than the resource cost because this inhabitant does 
not pay for parking. Since the parking cost per vehicle kilometre is € 0.17, the money 
price minus the taxes (0.280 - 0.089 = 0.191) is € 0.17 below the resource cost (0.191 
+ 0.17 = 0.361). Commuters who do not pay for parking pay a money price of € 
0.280, while the resource cost is € 0.261. This difference does not exist for drivers 
who do pay for parking (cfr. row 3 for inhabitants and row 4 for commuters). 
The resource cost per kilometre of an inhabitant is higher than for a commuter. This is 
because parking costs are converted from a per trip basis to a per kilometre basis, and 
average total trip distances are higher for commuters than for inhabitants (cfr supra). 
As a consequence, the parking cost per kilometre is € 0.17 for inhabitants and € 0.07 
for commuters. The difference in per kilometre costs between payers and non-payers 
for parking is large. For inhabitants, the generalised price of a kilometre is 28 per cent higher if they have to pay for parking. For commuters, the difference is 11 per cent. A 
different way to illustrate the importance of parking costs is their share in the resource 
cost: 47 per cent for inhabitants, and 27 per cent for commuters. The importance of 
parking costs is an essential difference between an urban and an interregional 
transport situation. 
 
The cost of a kilometre by diesel car is lower than the cost for a petrol car. This is due 
to lower taxes on diesel vehicles and the lower resource costs per kilometre of diesel 
vehicles (due to higher average mileage). The high share of diesel cars in the vehicle 
stock in Belgium is due to this tax regime. 
 
The tax column reports the average tax paid per passenger-kilometre for the different 
categories. The level of tax needs to be compared with the marginal external cost and 
with the unpaid resource cost of parking. Taxes are far below marginal external costs 
in the peak period, while the situation is reversed in the off-peak. This suggests that 
the present tax structure is badly suited for the internalisation of external congestion 
costs that are particularly high in the peak period. This is a more general phenomenon 
as demonstrated by a wider set of European case studies with the TRENEN-II model 
(Proost et al.,2002). 
 
As for public transport, it is noted that the money price is equal in peak and off-peak. 
Resource costs differ strongly on a per passenger kilometre basis, however, because 
of differences in occupancy rates. As a consequence, peak period bus driving more 
than covers the marginal resource cost of the bus (including the capacity cost of the 
bus that is allocated fully to the peak), whereas in the off-peak the net taxes are 
strongly negative so off-peak bus transport is heavily subsidised. For public transport, 
the share of time costs in the total travel costs is higher than for private transport (80 
per cent in peak hours). The reason is that walking times to bus (or tram, or metro) 
stops, and waiting times at bus stops are included in the travel time. 
 
In the lower part of Table 3, the level and the composition of traffic has been 
summarised. Peak period traffic accounts for 62 per cent of total traffic, expressed in 
passenger kilometres. Public transport accounts for 28 per cent of all passenger 
kilometres. Within the peak period, 32 per cent of all passenger kilometres is 
produced by public transport. In the off-peak period, this share is 22 per cent. The 
explanation is that commuting trips, which are concentrated in peak hours, make more 
frequent use of public transport modes. The share of carpooling in the total number of 
passenger kilometres is also slightly higher during peak hours, because carpooling is 
more frequent in work trips than for trips with other motives. Given the expected 
traffic volumes, average speeds are expected to be about 23 km/h for passenger cars 
during peak hours, and about 50 km/h during the off-peak. Public transport travels 
more slowly than private transport. The share of passenger kilometres by diesel car in 
the total demand for passenger km by passenger car is 38 per cent. This share is 
higher than in most European cities, because, in Belgium, the tax structure on 
passenger cars used to be more favourable to diesel cars. 
 
Finally, Table 3 shows that aggregate tax revenues from private transport are positive, 
while those of public transport are slightly negative. The total value of the external 
costs of accidents, air pollution and noise (i.e. exclusive of congestion costs) is € 
0.432 million per day. The reference situation described here is inefficient, because of three reasons directly related to the transport sector. First the resource cost of parking 
is not charged to all the drivers. Second the external congestion cost, particularly high 
in the peak period, is not internalised. Third public transport prices are in general also 
smaller than their marginal social cost.  
 
Table 3: Characteristics of the Reference Situation (Brussels, 2005) 
 













Car, solo, small, petrol, free parking 
      Inhabitants  0.361 0.089 0.280 1.834  0.614 
   Commuters  0.261  0.089  0.280  1.834  0.614 
Car, solo, small, petrol, paid parking 
      Inhabitants  0.361 0.089 0.450 1.834  0.784 
   Commuters  0.261  0.089  0.350  1.834  0.684 
Car, solo, small, diesel, free parking 
      Inhabitants  0.326 0.083 0.271 1.863  0.547 
Bus/tram  (inhabitants)  0.080 0.039 0.12  0.092  0.587 
Off-peak 
Car, solo, small, petrol, free 
parking (inhabitants) 
0.359 0.083 0.271 0.047  0.419 
Bus/tram (inhabitants)  0.271  -0.151  0.12  0.014  0.521 
Volume and composition of traffic  mio pkm  Share (per 
cent) 





Peak, private  3.846  41.6  29.6  23.1   
Peak, public  1.839  19.9    20.6   
Off-peak, private  2.839  30.7  25.4  49.7   
Off-peak, public  0.727  7.9    44.2   
Tax revenue (mio €/year)         
   Private  152,4         
   Public  -30,0         
External costs other than 
congestion (mio €/year) 
129,6        
 
3. What is the added value of different pricing instruments? 
Constructing a package of pricing instruments is an important component of the 
selection of a succesful implementation plan for marginal social cost pricing. Here we 
start with the easiest instrument to implement (parking), add public transport pricing, 
and complete the policy package with electronic road pricing. We analyze the value 
added of each of the instruments. Table 4 sets out the order in which we combine 
instruments and describes each of them in more detail.   
 
Table 4: Implementation plan for Brussels 
 























Parking only  Set parking fees 
at resource cost 
Urban area  
Parking pricing 


































over time  
Revenues are 























































We are interested in three questions:  
 
a)  What is the added value of the different pricing instruments? 
b)  How do the optimal values for the different policy instruments change when 
more policy instruments are added? 
c)  How does the most efficient equilibrium compare with the reference 
equilibrium? 
 
A property of a successful implementation path is that it transmits correct and 
plausible pricing signals to the public. Take as an example public bus prices. Our 
analysis shows that optimal public transport pricing, as long as peak car use is not 
priced correctly, requires very low public transport prices in the peak period. Table 5 
lists the peak bus prices and the welfare gains for the three different combinations of 
instruments that we study. The low public transport prices obtained in the absence of 
other instruments may be rather misleading as, once optimal road pricing is introduced, peak public transport prices have to increase strongly again. This conflict 
between short and long term signals has to be traded off with the welfare gain that can 
be achieved by using very low public transport prices in the peak in the transition to 
the full implementation of the other policies.  This short term welfare gain of very low 
public transport prices is, all in all, rather small.  
 
From our results we see also that there are decreasing returns or subadditivity when 
we add more pricing instruments. When public transport pricing is the only 
instrument we achieve a 0.18%
9 welfare gain but when public transport pricing is 
added to the parking instrument, this gain is reduced to 0.12% (0.54%-0.42%). 
 
Table 5: Comparing the four sets of instruments (Brussels, 2005)  
 
  Peak bus price  
(€ per pkm) 
Welfare gain (compared 
to reference)  
Parking only  0.039 0.42  % 
Public transport only  -0.080 0.18% 
Parking + Public 
transport 
-0.074 0.54  % 
Parking + public 
transport + time 
differentiated  electronic 
road pricing  
0.025   1.15% 
 
The pricing of parking is a more direct instrument. Making all car users pay the 
resource cost of parking is always an important component of the best pricing strategy 
and generates an important welfare gain. We conclude from this overview that a 
parking fee and a time-varying electronic toll are the principal pricing instruments to 
be used to reform urban transport pricing. This does not mean that public transport 
pricing need not be corrected, we only point out that it is far less important than the 
other two instruments in order to reach the most efficient urban transport equilibrium. 
 
It is of interest to examine the most efficient equilibrium, in which all three 
instruments are deployed, somewhat more closely in Tables 6 and 7. The first two 
lines in Table 6 show the charges to be paid by inhabitants and commuters in the peak 
period by a small gasoline car that has a single occupant. These two lines can be 
compared with the reference prices in Table 3. Now that the resource cost of parking 
is paid by every user, the net tax (including the time varying electronic toll) should 
approximate the marginal external cost
10. This is indeed the case: the taxes (0.466 and 
0.447 €/pkm) are indeed very close to the MEC (0.471 €/ pkm). The same holds for 
the public transport prices: the tax on the peak bus use  (0.025 €/pkm) is close to the 
marginal external cost (0.023 €/pkm). This implies a very strong increase in the 
money price for car use in the peak. Inhabitants pay now 0.827 €/pkm while those not 
having to pay for parking only paid 0.280 €/pkm, the difference is a parking fee of  
0.17 €/pkm and a tax increase of 0.377 €/pkm
11  The generalised price for inhabitants 
                                                 
9 The welfare gains are defined as a percentage of total generalised income.  
10 The reader may wonder why tolls do not perfectly match the MEC’s. The reason is that, there are 
more than 20 different transport alternatives that have each their  own MEC. With 3 instruments one 
can match most of the MEC’s but not all.   
11 0.377 €/pkm = (0.466 €/pkm of first line of table 6 – 0.089 €/pkm of first line of table 3) at the optimum is 1.023 €/pkm instead of 0.614 €/pkm. The difference (0.409 €/pkm) 
is smaller than the increase in parking fees and other taxes (0.17+0.377=0.547 €/pkm) 
because there is a reduction in transport time costs of 0.138 €/pkm. This corresponds 
to an increase in transport speed in the peak of 70%. 
 
There are three important sources of efficiency gains here: gains in road transport 
time costs, gains in the parking market (where everybody has to pay resource cost of 
parking), and gains in the public transport market.  
 
Table 6: Prices in most efficient urban transport equilibrium using as 
instruments parking fees at resource cost, time varying public transport prices 





















Inhabitants   0.361  0.466  0.17  0.827  0.471  1.023 
Commuters 0.261  0.447 0.07  0.708  0.471  0.904 
peak. bus  0.080  0.025  --  0.106  0.023  0.446 






Welfare gain over reference equilibrium: 1.15% 
 
 
It is interesting to see that the most efficient urban transport equilibrium does not 
entail a strong reduction of overall mobility. In Table 7 we see that overall volume of 
transport activity (pkm) is reduced by 4% compared to the reference. There is a 
stronger reduction in the off peak than in the peak because for off peak trips, the 
increase in parking fees is relatively more important and they have a higher own price 
elasticity (cfr. Table 1) , in addition also the large public transport subsidies (pricing 
below marginal social cost) are abolished. In the peak period, the market share of 
public transport is increased by 50% from 19.9% (bottom of Table 3) to 28.9% (Table 
7). In the off peak period, the share of public transport does not increase.  
 
In terms of overall tax revenues, the new equilibrium generates an increase in tax  
revenues from private transport of more than 300% (compare 152 million €/year in 
Table 3 with 523.8 Mio € in Table 6) while the public transport operations  no longer 
incur a deficit on their operations
12  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
12 We include investment or leasing of vehicles in the operating costs.  Table 7 Volumes in the most efficient urban transport equilibrium (Brussels, 
2005) 
 
Modal Share  Peak  Off-peak  Total 
Private Transport (%)  34.1  29.3  63.5 
Public Transport (%)  28.9  7.7  36.5 
Index Total Volume  
(reference=100) 
98.5 92.3 96.1 
Index Average Speed car  
(reference=100) 
171 100  
 
 
4  Sharing pricing instruments between two governments in a 
broader context. 
 
Transport pricing with multiple governments and externalities is complicated because 
different types of externalities occur simultaneously. There are the spillovers of 
congestion and environmental externalities but there also tax externalities.  This 
combination of problems has not been studied in great detail up to now.
13  In Table 8 
we summarize the most important externality problems that are relevant in urban 
transport policy. The three first externality problems are typical tax externality 
problems that are well known in the fiscal federalism literature.  
 
In the fiscal federalism literature one usually distinguishes between two types of tax 
externalities:  horizontal fiscal externalities and vertical fiscal externalities. A typical 
horizontal fiscal externality is tax exporting: each local government (city) tries to shift 
the tax mainly upon the foreigners (see, e.g., Arnott and Grieson (1981) or Dahlby 
(1996)). This will lead to higher taxes on goods that are typically consumed more 
heavily by commuters or tourists. A second type of horizontal tax externality is the 
competition between local governments for the same tax base. If capital is the mobile 
factor, many papers (see the survey in Wilson (1999)) suggest that tax competition 
puts downward pressure on tax rates and yields too low a level of public good supply. 
In transportation, the taxation of motor fuel is a nice illustration of  this.  
A common vertical fiscal externality is the taxation by both local and central 
government of the same tax base. This is an externality because whenever a local 
government decides to raise taxes it will not take into account fully the losses of tax 
revenues for the central government because only part of the centrally collected taxes 
will be returned to the local governments in grants. This may lead to too high tax 
levels. 
 
When a local government sets  transport charges and taxes, it will also take into 
account the traditional transport externalities but will do this in a different way than  a 
central government. Consider congestion on urban roads. A local government will be 
mainly concerned with the time delays of its citizens and not by the delays 
experienced by commuters and tourists as long as these delays do not affect the local 
tax base. The same holds for air pollution or accident externalities that affect mainly 
non residents.In Table 8 the ultimate effect of the different types of externality taxes 
                                                 
13 See De Borger & Proost (forthcoming) for a survey on which we draw here.  on the tax rates is not clear and will depend on the problem structure. Our short 
discussion shows that simply relying on local governments to set optimal transport 
taxes does not guarantee welfare optimal pricing. Over the years many instruments 
have been developed to overcome the tax externality problems. States may agree on 
minimum fuel taxes to avoid downward pressure on fuel taxes. Most countries have 
tax sharing agreements and use transfers of tax revenues from central to regional 
authorities to overcome horizontal and vertical tax externalities.  
 
The study of the role of local governments in the use of new pricing instruments to 
deal with congestion is somewhat lagging behind. This problem has two dimensions: 
the tax exporting dimension that is mainly of interest for urban problems and the tax 
competition dimension that is more relevant for interregional transport. In this paper 
we concentrate on the potential tax exporting problems in urban transport pricing. 
Some preliminary results on the second problem are found in De Borger et. al. (2005).  
 
Table 8: Tax externalities and other externalities with two government levels 
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 4. The urban pricing problem with two government levels 
studied in more detail 
 
A complete problem description requires four elements: (1) a representation of the urban 
transport problem, (2) a specification of the objective functions of urban and regional 
governments, (3) an allocation of transport pricing instruments over the two types of 
government, and (4) an assumption on the type of equilibrium.  
 
Before we can enter into more detail we need two important assumptions. The first is 
that we analyse only two government levels: an urban government and a regional 
government where the latter overlaps the urban area and has authority over a much wider 
area and a larger population. In reality there are often more than two overlapping 
government levels and there may be specific government institutions to deal with 
transport problems. 
  
The second important assumption is that the behaviour of each of the two government 
levels consists of maximising the welfare of the representative citizens in its 
constituency. We work with representative urban households and representative 
commuter households that live outside the city. This means that the urban government 
maximises the welfare of the inhabitants only
14. The regional government maximises 
a weighted sum of the welfare of its urban citizens and its non-urban citizens, where 
the weights correspond to their relative numbers in the population. This assumption 
implies that we do not study the two political processes in detail. This can be an 
important source of conflicts between government levels as the two levels may 
aggregate the preferences of the different groups of representative urban citizens in a 
different way. Moreover this assumption rules out all bureaucratic and political rent 
seeking. 
 
Table 9 describes the structure of the problem. The table contains two columns that 
describe two regulatory problems: the problem faced by the urban government and the 
problem faced by the regional government. In each case the corresponding objective 
function to be maximised, the externalities taken into account, and the set of relevant 
policy instruments are presented. The table presents but one of the many possibilities. 
We have selected a problem structure that applies to our case study of Brussels.  
 
We distinguish between three types of pricing instruments (cfr. upper part of Table 9): 
parking charges inside the city, public transport pricing and a cordon toll around the city. 
The urban government receives the net profit or loss of the urban public transport 
operations and receives all of the parking charge revenues but none or only part of the 
cordon toll revenues. The urban government redistributes the net revenues to its 
inhabitants. The regional government controls only the cordon toll and redistributes the 
cordon revenues to the commuters. 
 
Compared to the packages of instruments that we studied in Section 3 we make two 
simplifications. First we eliminate public transport pricing as an instrument. Second we 
replace the electronic time varying toll by a much simpler cordon toll that can not be 
                                                 
14 One observes sometimes low taxes for commuters and visitors. This can be explained by higher 
indirect tax margins on other consumption categories or by high urban payroll or profit taxes on these 
two groups. We do not consider this complication in this paper.  varied over time and only applies to the commuters. These simplifications are made to 
reduce the dimension of the problem we study: now each level has only one pricing 
instrument that it controls: parking fees (urban government) and time-invariant cordon 
toll (regional government). 
 
The urban government is concerned about the welfare of its residents and not about the 
welfare of the commuters. The total welfare considered by the urban government 
consists of three components. The first element is the utility or consumer surplus of the 
residents, the second component are the tax revenues that are returned to the citizens and 
the third element are the external costs other than congestion.  
 
The consumer surplus depends, among other things, on the generalized prices of 
passenger transport, which include all monetary expenses as well as the relevant time 
costs. It is via the time costs of travel that the external congestion costs are taken into 
account.  
 
The last elements in the objective function of the urban government are the external 
costs that affect its population. They include the external noise cost, the external accident 
costs and the urban air pollution costs. A rational urban government cannot be expected 
to take the non-urban impacts of air pollution into account if it is not forced to do so, 
moreover it only pays attention to the congestion externality that affects its own citizens 
as only the consumer surplus of the urban citizens matter for the urban government. 
 
The regional government is assumed to take into account the utility of the inhabitants 
and the commuters with equal weights. It values all tax revenues collected, the losses of 
all public transport firms and all externalities. The regional government can use a time 
invariant cordon toll as instrument to address congestion.  It is levied only on commuters 
when they enter the urban area. The toll revenue is redistributed by the regional 
government to the commuters only, and in a lump sum way.  
 
We neglect interactions of the transport taxes with other taxes in the economy (profit 
taxes, payroll taxes, income taxes). It is well known that there may be important 
interactions and that this affects the optimal level of congestion and environmental taxes 
as well as the optimal use of the tax revenues (Mayeres & Proost (1997)). This 
assumption implies that 1 € of urban or regional tax revenue has the same value as 1 € of 
user benefits for a representative citizen. We also neglect freight transport and its effect 
on product prices. 
 
Of course this set up is only but one of the many specific institutional structures that 
can exist. In order to specify the equilibrium of the game between the two government 
levels we need two more assumptions on the institutions. Firstly, the regional 
government can tailor its instruments specifically to the problems of one urban region - 
normally the regional government has to use the same instrument to address problems in 
many different localities. Secondly, we assume that the regional government has full 
information on local preferences and costs.   
 
Table 9  Problem structure with two active government levels 
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We study in this section five alternative equilibria for the game between the two 
governments (cfr. Table 10). When the regional government controls both the cordon 
toll and the parking charge, the outcome will be equal to the cooperative solution 
because the regional government maximizes the sum of the welfare of the urban and 
the non-urban citizens and controls all the instruments. In the Nash equilibrium, each 
of the government levels controls only one instrument and takes the behaviour of the 
other as given. This results in a mutual best reply equilibrium. In the Stackelberg equilibrium, the regional government announces its policy first knowing how the 
urban government will react. A Stackelberg equilibrium where the regional 
government is the leader is more plausible than the reverse because the regional 
government may very well need to announce a harmonised policy guideline for 
several urban areas at the same time.  
 
In the last two equilibria we give the urban government a share in the total cordon toll 
revenues.  
 
Table 10 Different equilibria considered  
 
Type of equilibrium Urban  government   Regional government 
Cooperative solution 
15  No active role  Regional  government 
controls parking charges 
and cordon toll  
Nash equilibrium without 
urban government 
sharing of toll revenues 
Controls parking charges 
and takes as given the level 
of the cordon toll 
Controls cordon toll and 
takes as given the level of 
the parking charge 
Stackelberg equilibrium 
without urban 
government sharing of 
toll revenues 
Controls parking charges 
and takes as given the 
cordon toll 
Controls cordon toll and 
takes into account, as 
Stackelberg leader, how the 
urban government reacts 
via the parking charge 
Nash equilibrium with 
urban government 
sharing of toll revenues 
As above 
but takes into account its 
share in cordon toll 
revenues 
As above  
Stackelberg equilibrium 
with urban government 
sharing of toll revenues 
As above  
but takes into account its 
share in cordon toll 
revenues 
As above  
 
 
5. Simulating transport pricing policies with two government 
levels: results  
 
The centralised or cooperative solution  
 
In the centralised solution the regional government controls all the policy instruments 
and has perfect information. As the welfare function of the regional government 
includes the welfare of the urban citizens and of the commuters, this solution can be 
interpreted as a cooperative equilibrium between the two levels of government. 
 
                                                 
15 The cooperative solution corresponds to the case where the regional government has all the power 
because the objective function of the urban government is one of the elements of the objective function 
of the regional government and the latter uses the same welfare weights for the urban citizens as the 
urban government.   The optimal or “centralised” policy is shown in the second row of Table 11. It 
involves a toll and an increase in parking fees beyond the resource costs that were 
resp. 0.07 €/veh-km for commuters and 0.17 €/veh-km for inhabitants. The drawbacks 
of the toll are that it is uniform over time, and that it only affects commuting traffic 
coming into the city and not the traffic of inhabitants.  As most commuting traffic is 
peak traffic, the uniform cordon toll is however still relatively efficient to discourage 
commuting peak traffic. In order to discourage the peak traffic of the inhabitants, the 
optimal policy is to supplement the cordon toll with a parking charge that covers more 
than the resource cost. This is the only instrument available in our set up to achieve 
this. Welfare is increased by € 170 per capita per year. 
 
Table 11: Performance of the different equilibria (Brussels, 2005) 
 
  Optimal parking 
fee (€/vehicle 
km) 




Gain in regional 
welfare as % of 




   — 
Centralised 
solution 
0.246/ 0.101  0.301  100% 
Nash 
equilibrium 
0.27/  0.11  0.29  89% 
Stackelberg 
equilibrium 
0.22 / 0.09  0.44   92%  
* In: inhabitants of city area, Out: outsiders or commuters 
 
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium  
 
In the Nash equilibrium, each government level optimizes its own objective function 
using the instruments it controls and taking the policy chosen by the other government 
as given. The optimal policy of each level of government becomes a function of the 
control chosen by the other government level. This function is called a reaction 
function. Equilibrium of the game is then reached when both reaction functions cross, 
this is a mutual best reply. 
 
Figure 3 shows the reaction functions of the urban and regional governments.  The 
flatter reaction function is the reaction function of the urban government that chooses 
its preferred parking fee while taking the cordon toll as given. The steeper reaction 
function represents the optimal cordon toll chosen by the regional government for a 
given parking fee. The latter reaction function also contains the centralised solution 
and shows that parking fees and cordon tolls are to some extent substitutes.  
 
The urban government’s reaction function reflects its interest in taxing commuters via 
high parking fees since the revenue is redistributed exclusively to urban citizens. 
Compared to the centralised solution, the Nash equilibrium (parking = 0.27, cordon 
toll = 0.29) has a higher parking fee and a lower cordon toll. Parking fees act here as a 
tax export mechanism (cfr. first line of Table 8). Nevertheless, the welfare gain achieved by the non-coordinated solution is only 11% below the fully coordinated 
solution (row 3 of Table 11).  
 
There are three reasons why the welfare loss of the non-coordinated solution is 
limited. First, the objective functions of the two governments are not that different: 
the urban government is concerned about the urban residents in the same way as the 
regional government In models that include several groups of urban voters instead of 
a representative citizen, the instabilities and path dependence of the political 
aggregation process itself could produce different political outcomes at urban and 
regional level, even in the absence of non-urban (McKelvey, 1979).. Second the 
ability of the city government to extract revenues from commuters by charging 
inefficiently high parking fees is limited as parking fees are also to be paid by city 
inhabitants. The two instruments are to be considered as close substitutes.  Once 
parking charges become very high, the inefficiency losses to the urban citizens 
outweighs the tax revenue gains and the speed increase enjoyed by commuters. The 
pricing inefficiency caused by the tax exporting motive would have been larger if the 
city government could control the cordon toll, which is paid by commuters only. The 
third reason is that greater efficiency losses would probably also result if either level 
of government did not act in the interests of its citizens. This could be due to 








































Figure 3: Reaction functions of the urban and regional government (Brussels, 
2005)
16 
                                                 
16 The flatter curve represents the parking fee setting of urban government – the steeper curve 
represents the cordon toll set by the regional government.  
 
  
The Stackelberg solution 
 
In the Stackelberg solution the regional government takes into account the tendency 
of the urban government to charge too high parking fees and announces therefore a 
relatively high cordon toll (0.44 rather than 0.29). This is the best strategy to limit the 
appetite of the city government for very high parking fees and revenues. Indeed, given 
this high toll the city government limits the parking fee to 0.22 (compared to 0.27 in 
the Nash equilibrium) because the commuters have already been taxed by the regional 
government. As a result, the Stackelberg equilibrium does better than the Nash 
equilibrium, with the welfare gain falling short of that in the centralised solution by 
only 8%. The welfare gain is logical when we know that the Stackelberg leader is a 
regional government that optimizes an objective function that contains an unweighted 
sum of the welfare of inhabitants and commuters. 
 Sensitivity analysis 
 
It has been assumed that the urban government does not receive any share in the 
cordon toll revenue, and this results in a high parking fee to extract revenue from 
commuters. One way to mitigate the city government’s tendency to overcharge for 
parking is to give it a share in the cordon toll revenues. To investigate this we now 
assume that the urban government receives a share equal to half its share of the total 
population of inhabitants and commuters. This causes the city government’s reaction 








































Figure 4: Reaction functions when the urban government receives a 50% share 
in the cordon toll revenue (Brussels, 2005)
17  
 
Comparison of Table 11 with Table 12 reveals that in the resulting Nash equilibrium 
parking charges are lower, the cordon toll is higher, and the efficiency loss relative to 
                                                 
17 The flatter curve represents the parking fee setting of urban government – the steeper curve 
represents the cordon toll set by the regional government the centralised solution is only 6.5% instead of 11%. The Stackelberg equilibrium is 
also improved, with an efficiency  loss of only 3% rather than  8%. The greater 
efficiency in either equilibrium comes at a price in equity, however, because  the 
commuters receive an even smaller share of the toll revenue they pay. 
Table 12: Performance of the different equilibria when the urban government 
receives a 50% share in the cordon toll revenue (Brussels, 2005) 
 
 Optimal  parking 
fee (€/vehicle 
km) 
In  /  Out * 
Optimal cordon toll 
(€/vehicle km) 
Gain in regional welfare 




   — 
Centralised 
solution 
0.246/ 0.101  0.301  100% 
Nash 
equilibrium 
0.22/  0.09  0.32  93.5% 
Stackelberg 
equilibrium 
0.24/0.10  0.34   97%  
* In: inhabitants of city area, Out: outsiders or commuters 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we analyzed the interaction between two overlapping government levels 
who each control one of the transport pricing instruments. As there are many 
interactions and many externalities between the two levels of government, a division 
of roles between the two government levels does not guarantee an efficient pricing 
outcome. Different tax externalities and the incomplete consideration of transport 
externalities may lead to over or undercharging by urban government levels. The 
precise result will depend on the institutional set-up and on the correspondence 
between the objective functions of the two government levels.  
 
To explore this problem we limited our attention to parking fees and a cordon toll as 
policy instruments and focussed on one city: Brussels.  The city government was 
assumed to choose the level of parking fees, while power to set the cordon toll resides 
with the regional government which has authority over a wider group of the 
population including the city’s. Both levels of government were assumed to behave 
benevolently on behalf of their constituents. The city government seeks to maximise 
welfare of the city inhabitants, and the regional government to maximise the welfare 
of both inhabitants and commuters.  
 
In this setting an efficiency loss occurs because the city government overcharges for 
parking in order to export taxes to commuters that are outside its jurisdiction. The 
regional government is forced to respond by setting a cordon toll that is lower than the 
first-best optimal level in order not to discourage commuting too much. However, this 
incentive is constrained by the fact that city inhabitants also pay the fees. As a result, 
the non-cooperative Nash and Stackelberg equilibria achieve most of the welfare 
improvements that can be obtained in the fully coordinated centralised solution. The 
main reasons are (a) both governments are assumed to be welfare maximisers rather than revenue maximisers, and (b) parking fees and cordon tolls are substitutes. Further 
improvements can be achieved by changing the sharing rules for tax revenue in favour 
of the city inhabitants, although this comes at a cost of greater inequity to commuters. 
 
Our analysis has to be considered as a first exploration. The results depend on the 
precise institutional set up: what type of instruments can be used and what is the 
division of responsibilities between the two government levels. Furthermore we paid 
no attention to such factors as asymmetric information, and the political process itself 
that are at the heart of the decentralisation of transport policies to lower government 
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